Japan’s Navy: Its Steady Future Into the Ishiba Administration
2019 Exercise of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force
With the new year just around the corner, Shigeru Ishiba as the new Japanese Prime Minister, and an unstable stock market worrying foreign investors, it is about time for a new Japanese Ministry of Defense White Paper. With a new prime minister comes new focuses, and Shigeru Ishiba has proposed a myriad of changes from the status quo under Fumio Kishida. From training to the role of the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF), he wishes to revise major parts of the United States (US)-Japan Alliance, but one aspect of Japan’s military to consider is the navy, and what Shigeru Ishiba may revise related to its current composition and posture.
It is important to first discuss the importance of Japanese maritime capabilities in its security. While not a part of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF), the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) was involved in the 2011 Senkaku Island ramming incident, where a Chinese fisherman rammed into two JCG vessels. Soon after, in 2013, a Chinese frigate had allegedly locked on a targeting device at a JMSDF destroyer, raising tensions yet again. In more recent history, a JMSDF destroyer navigated the Taiwan Strait, enforcing freedom of navigation in the hotspot. And while it was a plane, China breached Japanese airspace very recently as well, only heightening tensions. While the JCG plays its own role in Japanese security, the JMSDF’s maritime capabilities are paramount when it comes to maintaining stability in the seas surrounding Japan, countering rogue actors and enforcing international law.
Looking at Japan’s naval capabilities on pages 231, 236, and 246 of the Japanese Ministry of Defense “Defense of Japan 2024” White Paper, the JMSDF, while not expanding, will be one of the most expensive and important aspects of Japan’s military capabilities and posture against belligerent nations such as China. Comparing the most recent Defense Buildup Plan (DBP) versus the 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and 2013 NDPG, Japan has slowly been increasing its anti-missile capabilities, but not growing its number of vessels. In fact, there are now more divisions than ever when it comes to “Surface Ship Units”, meaning that Japan may be attempting to disperse its capabilities like the US has begun to do in East Asia. Nevertheless, while Ishiba may have his own impact on these implemented strategies, his advisors may both influence him and have their own sway as well.
Going on to what Shigeru Ishiba wishes to revise, he mainly wishes to change the Status of Forces Agreement between the US and Japan, making the alliance more equal, but it may have fewer implications for the JMSDF rather than the Japanese Air Self Defense Force or the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force. In his paper at the Hudson Institute, Shigeru Ishiba labels his final section “Strengthening the Japan-US Alliance as Equal to the US-UK Alliance,” believing that making the alliance equal is now possible, and that the SDF should be allowed to station troops within areas such as Guam. In his first policy speech to the Diet, he also emphasized protecting the people of Japan, stating “safety and security for all,” as the second line of it. The impacts of this on naval training and capacity for action are unclear, with the US and Japan already jointly conducting maritime, land, and recently air drills. While politically this may shift the alliance towards a more equal footing, it may not have any tangible impacts in a conflict scenario, aside from an increase in joint actions with the US. Domestically, especially related to funding, Ishiba has shown his slant towards military matters.
Ishiba has shown his own background as Minister of Defense by appointing four former defense ministers to high-ranking positions, most notably Takeshi Iwaya and Gen Nakatani as Foreign Minister and Minister of Defense respectively. Defense Minister Nakatani, a veteran himself, has called for a revision to the Constitution to allow for the Prime Minister of Japan to “command and supervise the military”, as well as to allow collective self-defense. He also has served as a special advisor starting in November 2021 to Fumio Kishida regarding human rights abuses in China, the position being removed in September of 2023. In a 2021 interview, he proposed checking China’s military rise alongside the US. During his tenure so far as defense minister, he has reaffirmed, at a NATO meeting, Japan’s defense ties with New Zealand, Australia, and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Showing a willingness to work with allies, Takeshi seems to be of a similar yet clashing mind, stating that he expects China to “behave” in the international world, while also pushing Ishiba’s concept of an “Asian NATO” down the road. On top of this, he was Defense Minister when two major incidents occurred; an ROK destroyer locked on to a Japanese plane and Japan refused to join ROK exercises after demands that Japan remove its Rising Sun Flag. Iwaya, although negotiations were ultimately futile, was a part of talks related to solving a territorial dispute between Russia and Japan, demonstrating his importance politically as well rather than only in the military. This shows Ishiba’s tilt towards the military, but also how his ministers differ, and how they may even clash with Ishiba’s own military and foreign policy ideas.
With Ishiba's own background as Minister of Defense, as well as both Nakatani and Iwaya’s confrontational stances towards China, it is moderately likely that the navy will receive either an upgrade or a wholesale expansion of its numbers, or possibly both. While it is hard to tell what Ishiba himself may do, a deal signed on September 18th under Fumio Kishida with the Japanese Ministry of Defense ordering two Aegis equipped vessels has not been canceled by Shigeru Ishiba, a sign he may agree with the expansion. On top of this, the JMSDF has been gaining experience with its veteran counterparts, with a naval exercise having been conducted from September 23-28. Organizational changes are on the horizon too, already put into motion by Fumio Kishida, where the Fleet Escort Force and Mine Warfare Force will be replaced by a Fleet Surface Force. Additionally, during a recent meeting between the Japanese, British, and Italian defense ministers, a planned next-generation fighter development plan started under Fumio Kishida has been accelerated, as per the statements of Defense Minister Gen. While Ishiba seems set on protecting Japan as per his policy speech, mostly through expanding and reorganizing the navy to prevent maritime incursions, it may still be too early to tell, especially with his narrow victory in the election for the office of Prime Minister.
In all, for only being in office a short period of time, Shigeru Ishiba looks likely to continue the trends, set in place by Fumio Kishida, of expanding, reorganizing, and training the JMSDF, while simultaneously advocating for equality not only in Japan’s alliance with the US but also specifically with its military. Ishiba’s choices of Iwaya as Foreign Minister and Nakatani as Minister of Defense emphasize Ishiba’s concern with military matters. Any changes will be closely watched by all of Japan’s neighbors. While Ishiba and his ministers have started to backtrack the speed at which he plans to implement his idea of an Asian NATO, he may reimplement them if there is newly formed popular demand due to the LDP’s lackluster showing in the recent election, losing a coalition majority for the first time since 2009. While this puts Ishiba’s plans in a precarious position, both within the LDP due to his narrow victory and nationally having lost many seats, he may be able to hold power if he plays his cards right, keeping the current naval policies in place for the time being.