Ishiba Diplomacy and What it Means for the US Latticework in the Indo-Pacific

President Donald Trump (right) meets with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba in the White House (2025)

Credit: Wikimedia Commons

Recently, the world has begun to notice Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba’s reconciliatory approach to China-Japan relations, having already met Xi on the sidelines of the APEC summit in December of 2024 and expressing his hope to visit China in the near future. There has been little talk about the implications of such a foreign policy on the US’ diplomatic approach in the Indo-Pacific during the Biden administration, known as the Latticework approach. While not applied solely to the Indo-Pacific, the latticework plans to abolish the US hub-and-spokes system, where each nation would only have ties with the US and not other nations, replacing it with the approach to establish as many connections as possible among US allies. Ishiba’s rapprochement toward China may both harm and help US diplomatic strategy in the Indo-Pacific, as China’s inclusion in the US-led liberal international order will both constrain China but also allow for China to maneuver within the system to attempt to overtake the US in its own international institutions. 

Starting with Ishiba’s diplomatic outlook and its reasoning, he was a rival of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe which formed the core of his policy, but he is constrained by his loose grip over the Diet as he is leading a minority government. The former explains his willingness to cooperate with China, as Abe was seen as a Japanese nationalist and an anti-China hawk and Ishiba seems to want to distance himself from his foreign policy, while the latter shows why he is not going towards full throttled reconciliation with China over very contentious issues, such as the Senkaku Islands dispute that have resulted in physical clashes. Nevertheless, he has seemingly continued the Free and Open Indo-Pacific framework that was created by Shinzo Abe and then carried over to the Suga Yoshihide and Fumio Kishida administrations as well. Parties within Japan, such as the main liberal opposition party called the Constitutional Democratic Party, have imposed limits on what Ishiba is able to do in regard to the US-Japan alliance, China-Japan relations, and rearmament. All of these factors are crucial to understanding what Ishiba has thus far done in regards to his diplomatic outreach and what the impacts will be for the US’ diplomatic posture.  

The US, during the Biden administration, focused on a latticework approach in the Indo-Pacific that may be continued by the Trump administration through forums such as the Quad. While trade relations have now been upturned and used for domestic political gain by the Trump administration, security relationships remain strong with nations who prioritize security spending and reducing the trade surplus they have with the US. While this is not the same latticework approach taken by the Biden administration, this current administration may continue it with nations who take security and trade matters into their own hands and appeal to Trump’s grandiose sense of self. Collective security arrangements are the most likely form of latticework measures that Trump will take part in, but these may be damaged if any nation shows any friendly signs towards Beijing diplomatically. During Ishiba’s tenure, this may hinder the US’ plans and strategies aimed towards Beijing. 

Ishiba’s strategy appears to be two-fold, strengthening the US-Japan Alliance while also ameliorating tensions between Japan and China. While not impossible, this is a very arduous task for a prime minister that has a minority government. People such as Sanae Takaichi, the face of the far-right of the Liberal Democratic Party which Ishiba heads, or Yoshihiko Noda, the head of the CDP, will attempt to force through their agendas on both the foreign and domestic levels. When he had a majority in the Diet, Ishiba proposed an “Asian NATO,” a concept that proved contentious in Beijing. In his first overseas visit he did not mention this project, and has not ever since. Nevertheless, his administration has warmed relations towards Beijing and has been challenged by the Trump administration in Washington. The latter seems adamant on imposing 25% tariffs on automotive imports from Japan, while the former has taken goodwill steps, such as removing a buoy from the exclusive economic zone around the Senkaku Islands, to ensure good relations in the future. If Japan moves towards bandwagoning with China rather than balancing with the US or even hedging with China, then the US may fail to ensure a critical ally continues to participate within the US latticework of Asia. 

Even though Japan has more to gain from maintaining its independence in the international order through reaping benefits from both sides through potential treaties or agreements, if US-China relations deteriorate it may have to pick a side, and Ishiba’s diplomacy which has been influenced by far-right pressure in Japan through Sanae Takaichi and pressure from the Trump administration in Washington, may result in the deterioration of the US-Japan Alliance to a level not seen since the 1980’s US-Japan trade war. Japan has its own interests as a “smart power,” meaning that it maximizes its potential resources, to participate in forums such as the East Asia Summit, the Quad, as well as a myriad of other Association of Southeast Nations-centric organizations, but as China’s influence grows, it could jeopardize Japan’s status within these organizations if China turns hostile. This would harm Japan’s strong position internationally as well as mitigate its strengths as a smart power. While nothing like this has happened yet, China has made organizations to challenge Japan and the US, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to challenge the Asian Development Bank. This is one of the many reasons Japan may turn from a highly valued partner in the Indo-Pacific into a rival power if the US or domestic forces push Ishiba to make concessions on the international stage that either cause Ishiba and his administration to become worried about US hegemony, or if those sympathetic to China vote him out and replace him with a pro-China politician.  Despite how unlikely it may be, the US must prepare for all possible outcomes.

In the end, Japan’s future is uncertain and may be at a turning period with its current administration. The LDP still holds a very important role within Japanese politics despite CDP and Japan Innovation Party gains in the recent election, meaning that the status quo is what many continue to strive for in Japan. These opposition parties are closer to China as well as even further away respectively. On the other hand, Ishiba represents a group of LDP politicians like former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei who mentored him; suggesting they have a more pragmatic foreign policy outlook, albeit limited by external pressures.  These more pro-China politicians could steer Japan away from the US latticework which would cripple US authority in the region due to its economic presence and the loss of US bases in the region. Even though other bases could provide some of the same missions which the US bases in Okinawa, Kyoto, and other Japanese areas do, it would still be a massive blow to both the First Island Chain defense strategy and the US’ diplomatic latticework. This is the reason why the US must ensure cooperation with Japan to counter any byproducts of Japanese diplomacy with China while also expanding the US latticework with Japan taking on a key role in the Indo-Pacific as a guardian of the liberal international order. Despite how strong the US-Japan Alliance may be at the moment, Ishiba’s pro-China pivot could jeopardize US influence in the region if Ishiba is pressed too hard by US lawmakers, or if he is removed from office by unhappy politicians or voters.