Marching Towards the Future: The Potential Implications of a European Union Army
NATO Defense Ministers met in Brussels, Belgium (2011)
Credit: Cherie Cullen / Wikimedia Commons
Many of the expected foreign policy challenges of Trump 2.0 have already reared their heads, with the most immediate security issue being that of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. That has most recently come to a head with Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to the White House, resulting in a tense exchange in front of the cameras between President Donald Trump, Zelensky, and Vice President JD Vance.
While the potential future for Ukraine warrants commentaries in several fields, there also exists a broader challenge for the security of Europe. With Trump’s known disdain for the “cost” of supporting allies, and his increasing rapprochement with Putin, some have argued that Europe needs to shift its own policy to adapt. This discussion is primarily framed through the creation of a new, European army, to defend members of the European Union. The idea of a European Army is not a new one. In 2015, the President of the European Commission briefly floated the idea of a pooling of resources to stand up to Putin. Macron similarly supported such an idea in 2018 and 2021, with the goal of having at minimum a rapid response team capable of dealing with threats should the US be unable to. With waning security guarantees, now is the perfect time to discuss the potential implications of an EU Army, both in terms of security and the politics of Europe.
The former necessitates a discussion of how such a force would be shaped. The creation of an army would necessarily be for self-defense, providing a backstop should Russian aggression target a member of the European Union. It would also provide a stronger deterrent to invasion, in particular if US commitments to NATO’s Article 5 wane. A rapid response force, composed of individuals from around Europe, and with integrated capabilities, would ensure Europe has an ability to counter future aggression. This truly is the most straightforward case possible — a de facto replacement of NATO commitments with an expansion to include all members of the European Union.
The more challenging question, however, is the politics surrounding such an army. In particular, the creation of a European army raises critical questions regarding the purpose of the European Union. The European Union, as established under the Single European Act, is an economic union first. Later treaties, such the Maastricht Treaty, resulted in an expansion into the idea of “One Europe,” with European citizens and a European government. Even that notion remains contested, with national powers continually pushing back against the European Commission and Parliament to find a sufficient balance of power.
Creating a standing army for Europe, even if the intent is not to wield it abroad, trades off with a degree of sovereignty that member states would otherwise have. It requires adherence to a formal policy, likely would require proportional drafting/deployment, and countless other measures. That sovereignty trade-off plays into the age-old question of what exactly the European Union intends to be. In much the same way that the US had to choose between the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, the future of the European Union lies between an intergovernmental organization and a supranational institution. The former necessarily means Member States have the freedom to pursue their own policies and security practices, with NATO operating as the closest thing to a European Army. The latter necessitates a massive restructuring of the European Union to begin operating with a stronger executive and legislative system, focusing on more than just the Four Fundamental Freedoms of the market and into a true entity acting on behalf of the continent.
This consideration is necessary because of the current limitations of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which clearly outlines the types of security policy that the EU can pursue. Some address these concerns, arguing that TFEU 42.7 provides necessary legal backing in order to provide support. TFEU 42.7 is the EU’s functional equivalent to Article 5 of NATO. It requires Member States to respond in the event of an instance of aggression against other Member States, with certain caveats. While TFEU 42.7 may provide short-term justification for the creation of a small standing force, it in no way provides sufficient legal backing for a broader army structure. TFEU 42.7 is stated to operate within the scope of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, necessarily meaning that action is post-facto.
An alternative path for a European Army is via TFEU 42.2, which states more explicitly that the European Council can vote to create a common defense. The challenge here, however, lies in the political realm: such a vote must be unanimous. This means that the executive leaders in all 27 member states would be required to agree to make the necessary changes to create a European Union Army.
Moreover, Article 42.2 & 42.7 provide for neutrality and NATO commitments built into national policy to take precedence, giving de facto opt-out choices for Member States. In stating that the obligation to provide support “shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States,” both articles ensure that even if the necessary conditions are met, the obligation to commit doesn’t exist. That functionally turns both clauses into the equivalent of Article III of the Articles of Confederation.
This challenge is magnified when considering the status quo and the necessary scope that a European Army would need to have. The EU’s current Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) provides for many degrees of cooperation between Member States, with the noticeable absence of a permanent, standing, transnational force. The CSDP includes a research and defense fund, clear command structures for non-military, and significant investments into a collective defense industrial base. The only explicit benefits of implementing a European Union Defense Force would therefore be having a standing army, navy, and air force, and it would necessitate a massive reworking of the current TFEU to remove the exceptions currently present.
Does this mean that the EU ought to scrap the idea of having a collective defense force? Absolutely not. A European Army may be the necessary evolution of the EU moving forward. And in many ways, the CSDP illustrates a move of the European Union towards a collective defense force. But to take the more significant step of a permanent, sizable force capable of fighting on behalf of Europe, discussions have to answer what role the EU will play in global and European affairs. Although the European Union has straddled the line since the Maastricht Treaty, it is now facing a multipolar world where US security guarantees are declining. The question of a European Army is the question of the EU’s governing structure, its intent, and its future.
A transformation of the European Union into the “United States of Europe” would come with significant challenges, but it may be the necessary step for Europe in a world without the US operating as a global security leader. And the creation of a European Army may be the first step into that transformation, introducing another democratic power into the multipolar world we will soon face. Under the current US administration, a transformed Europe would become the backstop to democratic backsliding around the world. And if the US returns to its non-isolationist policies, Europe would exist as a stronger partner to deal with future challenges.