Russia’s Hub and Spokes: A New Axis Stemming from Russia’s War in Ukraine

President of Russia, Vladamir Putin and Supreme Leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Un during a state visit, 2024
Credit: Presidential Executive Office of Russia / Wikimedia Commons

In October, according to the author’s interview with Ryan McBeth, an intelligence analyst and content creator, it was discovered that around 12,000 special forces from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) were sent to train around Vladivostok in the far east of Russia’s territory. Now these troops have moved to Kursk, where they have now engaged in combat. This is only one part of an escalating situation where China and the DPRK are seemingly assisting Russia’s war in Ukraine, going against the US and its allies. While political support on the world stage may assist Russia, feasible and tangible goods matter a lot more to Russia in the conflict rather than kind words of support and endorsement, and the main two powers who seem to be providing this assistance are the DPRK and China. This paper will outline recent developments relating to China and the DPRK’s assistance sent to Russia in terms of equipment and personnel, showing a growing axis on a bilateral basis between the three anti-status quo powers.  

Starting with China’s clandestine support for Russia’s conflict in Ukraine, China has been the host to a Russian drone lab, increasing exports of dual-use items for weapons manufacturing, and increasing military equipment exports as well. The drone lab in China seems to not only be geared to produce designs for drones, such as a new long ranged drone called the G3, but it also has the ability to produce them as well. Experts within China have also been assisting Russians at the lab, the former of whom have been sanctioned by the United States. Regarding dual-use items, exports have increased 60% since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia has become very reliant on China for weapon manufacturing machinery and materials due to international sanctions. While China is claiming to clamp down on exports, specifically with a new initiative that will take effect by December 1st, it is yet to be seen if there is any actual effect. On top of this, the Chinese body armor market has been a boon for Russians, with orders rapidly expanding since the beginning of the invasion. These shipments were routed through Turkey, possibly to allay any suspicions by outside actors. Chinese contractors have also sold assault rifles to Russian companies, showing that while the Chinese state may not wish for these transactions to take place officially between the Chinese and Russian governments, they will tolerate transactions in the private sector. This goes to show that while China has not officially been supporting Russia throughout the entirety of the invasion, China has been willing to overlook the private sector’s support through business dealings as well as secretly supporting Russia’s own research and production of drones, even allowing for dual-use parts to be sold to Russia for their arms-manufacturing industry. 

On the flip side, the DPRK’s assistance to Russia has been clear and unambiguous, with the most recent support of sending troops having been referenced earlier. Before the increase in government relations, there were trades between the DPRK and the Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, for the latter to obtain weapons for its fighting in Ukraine. Kim Jong-Un's first summit since 2019 was with Vladimir Putin in 2023, where Kim stated his unconditional support for Russia. In June of 2024, Putin and Kim also signed a partnership where both leaders pledged aid to each other if they face aggression from any other power, which is around the same time that news broke stating the DPRK sold millions of artillery shells to Russia. While only artillery shells have been verified so far, it is also possible that the DPRK has sold missiles to Russia as well. All these munition sales, including small arms sales, seem to have been systemized, where Russia has set shipment routes as well as storage facilities for DPRK-sourced munitions spanning all the way to Ukraine. Since then, the DPRK has sent troops to train around Vladivostok in Russia for the fight in Ukraine, with many more proposed to be sent. While reports are unclear, it looks to be that DPRK troops have engaged Ukrainian troops in combat. And while not arms or personnel based, it is important enough to mention that even the hermit kingdom of the DPRK has only slightly opened its borders to very small Russia-DPRK trade.This all goes to show that the DPRK does not attempt to hide their support for Russia and its invasion of Ukraine, but rather openly endorses it, providing critical munitions and personnel to Russia. Another question is, what tangible impacts does this have for the fight in Ukraine? 

While aid from the DPRK and China has been critical to allow Russia to remain in the fight, some of this assistance has been a double-edged sword, especially from the DPRK. Starting with the aid given from the DPRK, while some of the costs for Russia have been obvious, such as more aid for the DPRK, some were initially not, such as shoddy artillery shells. Initially, artillery shells from the DPRK were of such poor quality that possibly half of them were liable to explode not against Ukrainian forces, but against Russian ones. Now with a DPRK flag being seen in the Donetsk region of Eastern Ukraine, it is safe to say that the military assistance from the DPRK is coming quickly with little material cost, aside from aid, for Russia, something critical to filling manpower shortages that Russia is facing. But one other cost of the DPRK’s assistance is that Ukraine may now use US-given weapons without any new restrictions, the result of which is shown at Kaspiysk. That is the place where Ukraine flew an explosive-laden drone into a Russian warship on Russian territory, something they may not have risked under threats of new US sanctions on the usage of US weapons. On the flip side, Chinese aid has, as stated before, allowed for the Russian arms industry to continue production of small arms, constituting about half of all “key military goods” imported in the months since March of 2023. When it comes to Chinese aid, the main issue for Russia is a clandestine one, specifically that of China stealing Russian technology. While Russia may not suffer in the short term, it removes any sort of advantage that Russia may possess over China technologically in the case of any future conflicts between the two powers, especially with the history of border clashes during the Cold War. All of these examples go to demonstrate that Russia may be gaining assistance for minimal to no overt costs, but underneath the surface there are costs that Russia may not be considering in the long term.

Overall, this goes to show the link between Russia and the DPRK as well as China when it comes to tangible resources and personnel. While China has not openly supported the Russian war effort, the DPRK is much more willing to align itself with Russia in order to receive support from Russia in terms of food and funding. China’s support has been crucial to allowing the Russian arms industry to continue its existence, but in return the Chinese may be stealing Russian technology, and also taking payments for its sales to Russian firms. While the assistance, and the costs attached, have been mostly clear for Russia, the implications for the war have been less clear in terms of tangible results. Even though it is clear that this assistance is necessary for Russia’s continued advances in Ukraine, the specific results of the aid remain unclear. This also highlights the growing axis between the three nations, withmany connections between the DPRK and China as well but onless solid footing. This goes to show that a group alliance between the three powers will be near impossible, but growing bilateral relations, even if only towards Russia by the DPRK and China, means that any attempts to dislodge one of the powers from the bilateral alliances by the US will be unlikely to succeed to dislodge the network in its entirety. Now, with a growing anti-US axis, much like the old UShub and spokes alliance network in East Asia, spanning from the Urals to the Sea of Japan, the US is in precarious waters, one which it has faced before, but not in its current, more decentralized form, setting the stage for possible conflicts to come.