Over the past two administrations in the White House, the United States has increasingly moved away from the principle of strategic ambiguity that is supposed to shape U.S. foreign and defense policy toward the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China. This piece examines the origins of strategic ambiguity as a policy, reviews its effectiveness, and argues that there is a need for the U.S. to actively restart abiding by the constraints of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and the principles enshrined therein.

With Russia's invasion of Ukraine stretching out far past its beginning phase, Russia has now reached out to other actors for assistance. Without a general mobilization, Russia cannot keep its current manpower in the field, so it has reached out to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for manpower and weapons. It has also reached out to China for weapons and munitions, most notably creating a drone lab within China to produce new types of drones for the frontline. These new diplomatic relations are seemingly forming Russia's diplomatic relations into a new hub and spokes type system, very reminiscent of the United States in Asia, creating a new, more decentralized threat which the US must be very cautious to interact with.

While extensive, Western aid has had many shortcomings within its framework of multilateral lending, leading to debt burdens and inefficiencies. Meanwhile, China, through its Belt and Road Initiative, offers infrastructure-centric investments without the strings attached, making it an attractive alternative to the West’s offerings. The paper concludes by giving recommendations on how to increase the effectiveness of Western aid while competing with China's growing influence in global development.